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Recent Books
BOOK REVIEWS
LES OFFICIALITES A LA VEILLE DU CONCILE DE TRENTE. By
Anne Lefebvre-Teillard. Paris: R. Pichon et R. Durand-Auzias.
1973. Pp. vii, 291. (Bibliotheque d'Histoire du Droit et Droit Romain, no. 19) 48 FF.

Like the blind men examining the elephant in the child's poem,
scholars examining the practice of church courts in the Middle Ages
and Renaissance have tended to assume that the part which they
have studied is representative of the whole. 1 There are, indeed,
powerful reasons for assuming the unitary nature of church court
practice: The canon law taught in the universities knew no national
boundaries, and until the Reformation the church courts recognized
a superior jurisdiction in the Court of Rome. Furthermore, the
records of the church courts are scattered, spotty, hard to read, and
largely unpublished. Once one has gone through the painful process
of mastering the records of a given jurisdiction for a given period,
it is altogether too tempting to assume that one has an adequate picture of the whole. As we are now coming to realize, however, the
practice of the church courts was not unitary; it varied from place
to place, not only between countries but within countries, and it also
varied over time, not only as the academic and papal law evolved,
but also quite independently of that evolution. 2
For the legal historian, the great interest of the church courts
lies in these variations. How are we to explain them? The church
courts are the intersection point of a number of competing forces:
the academic canon law with its highly developed, sometimes abstruse doctrines; the papacy with its ever-changing political influence;
secular law and institutions, the former completing the legal setting
within which the church courts operated, the latter concerned with
protecting their secular jurisdiction; and local society, which created
the problems which the church courts were called upon to resolve.
Thus, the church courts provide an excellent paradigm for the study
of the way in which law and society interact. Although it is possible •to
study the interaction of these forces in the context of one particular
1. P. HAIR, BEFORE TIIE BAWDY COURT (1972), is particularly prone to this offense, and even P. FOURNIER, LES OFFICIALITES AU MOYEN AGE (1880), has a tendency to fill in details from the academic canon law when he lacks documentation
from the practice.
2. See, e.g., pp. 179-206, for variations in the French practice of granting separations.
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.court, a comparative dimension aids in helping us to understand
which element-church law or institutions, secular law or institutions,
or local society-was decisive in shaping the practice of the church
courts.
Mme. Lefebvre-Teillard has studied the French officialitejd from
1490 to 1540. Although she relies heavily on the most complete
set of church-court records from her period-those of the court of
the archdeacon of Paris-she. seems to have examined all of the
known deposits of French church-court records from her period, and,
in some cases, she has searched beyond her period (pp. 3-12). She
is quite conscious of the variations among her courts, both as to the
different types of cases brought before them and as to the ways in
which those cases were. resolved;4 she tries, as many students of the
church courts have not, 5 to show the relationship between the
academic canon law and the actual practice of her courts; she offers
a comprehensive view of the relationship between the church courts
and the secular courts in her period (pp. 129-38); and she occasionally provides insights into the relationship of the church courts to the
society in which they operated. 6 Yet, good as the book is, it
can only be regarded as a beginning.
I leave to the margin my technical criticisms of the book, 7 save
3. The word is hard to translate. "Officiality" is not often used in English, and
"church court" is both too broad in that it encompasses courts which had no official,
such as a court of papal judges delegate, and too narrow in that it implies exercise
solely of what today we would regard as judicial functions; the officialites also performed administrative or quasi-judicial functions. We can preserve the ambiguity of
the term if we define an ofJicialite as a department of ecclesiastical governance,
headed by a functionary known as an official who exercised the jurisdiction of a superior ecclesiastical officer, such as a bishop or archdeacon. See pp. 25-32.
4. One should not take too seriously her assertion of a "unite profonde du systeme
Judiciaire et du droit applique" (p. 4). The contents of the book substantially qualify
this assertion. See, e.g., pp. 116-19, 254-63 (testamentary cases); pp. 222-50 (contract cases).
5. See, e.g., B. WOODCOCK, MEDIEVAL EccLESIASTICAL COURTS IN nra DIOCESE OF
CANTERBURY 4 (1952) ("[N]o adequate basis exists for the correlation of the
practice of particular courts with the injunctions of the canon law").
6. See, e.g., pp. 242-43 (discussion of inflation and the obligation to pay a fixed
sum of money).
7. My most serious criticism has to do with the number of errors in the quotations from Latin documents. For example, there are twenty-seven errors and questionable readings on the first two pages of the Documents Annexes (pp. 267-68).
These range in seriousness from omission of (or failure to supply) a conjunction
(Doc, 1, between prosequitur and se iactavit); to failure to extend (Doc. 2, id. for
idem); to a fairly consistent practice of transcribing tt as ct, making forms of mittere
(Docs. 1 & 3) look like forms of mingere (wicked thought!); to false agreement
(Doc. 6, hanc for hunc). Such a high rate of error can only cast doubts on the
accuracy of Mme. Lefebvre-Teillard's readings which are not obviously erroneous.
Further, Mme. Lefebvre-Teillard's apparatus of footnotes leaves much to be desired. She makes a number of substantive statements for which she offers no support,
e.g., p. 46 (with regard to the age of majority); p. 59 n.79 (with regard to interlocutory sentences); p. 252 n.10 bis (with regard to prenuptial contracts), or for
which she offers support without citation, e.g., p. 148 n.7 (synodal statutes). Im-
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to say that it is marred by an unusually large number of silly errors
and omissions, which do not, so far as I can tell, affect its main
themes. My major concern, however, is with the scope of the book.
Mme. Lefebvre-Teillard takes a nation, France, as the geographical
area for her survey. This is a natural choice given the relative ease
of access to archives in one's own country; moreover, of the forces
which determined church-court practice, the secular law (to a considerable extent), and ecclesiastical institutions (to a certain extent),
operated on a national level. On the other hand, the academic
canon law and the papacy transcended national boundaries, while
society tended to operate on a much more local level than it does
today. By choosing a national scope for her study, Mme. LefebvreTeillard runs the risk of overemphasizing those influences on the
practice of the church courts which operated on a national level, and
underemphasizing those which operated on either a supranational or
a local level.
Because Mme. Lefebvre-Teillard's book does not provide
enough of the personal and social context of the local church-court
practice, it fails as a local study, as a building block upon which
broader studies can be based. For example, one of Mme. LefebvreTeillard's most interesting findings is that during the period covered
by her study the officialite of Cambrai and that of Montivilliers differed markedly from the rest of France in their practice of granting
marital separations (pp. 201-05). Cambrai's practice was loose:
The court granted separations from bed and board on the ground of
what we might, without too much anachronism, call "irretrievable
breakdown. of the marriage" (mor.um incompatibilitas). Montivilliers' practice, on ·the other hand, was strict: The court apparently
refused to grant even separation of goods on the ground of simple
cruelty. The church courts in the rest of France seem to have fallen
some place in between, granting separation of goods fairly freely but
reserving separation from bed and board for cases of adultery or
aggravated cruelty. 8
portant concepts are sometimes not defined, e.g., letters nisi, pp. 98, 116, 125, 26970, or are defined after their first appearance. For example, on p. 30 we encounter
a reference to "un systeme de prevention"; that system is not defined until p. 45,
where we are told (n.3) that more details will be forthcoming on p. 234; p. 234 does
not say anything about the system, which is, in fact, discussed on pp. 140-43. It
is useless to multiply the examples of misprints, e.g., pp. 132 n.219, 224 1.21 (wrong
font); p. 245 (n.141 misnumbered "142"), or miscitations, e.g., p. 56 n.61 ("Decretales 11, 22, 12" for "Decretales II, 22, 12"); p. 57 n.72 ("Decretales 11, 19, 4" for
"Decretales II, 19, 4"[?]). Suffice it to say that the cause of scholarship would have
been better served if the production of this book had been delayed for some thorough
editorial work.
8. Separation from bed and board (separatio quoad thorum) carried with it most
of the consequences of modem divorce, except that the parties were not free to remarry (pp. 185-86); separation of goods (separatio quoad bona) was, in fact, more
than a separation of property: the parties were permitted to live apart. They were,
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Why did Cambrai and Montivilliers develop practices so different
from each other and from the rest of France? The period is short
enough that we could be dealing with nothing more than the idiosyncracies of two judges. But Mme. Lefebvre-Teillard does not tell
us who the judges were, much less what, if anything, is known about
them. Another possibility is that this divergence in practice can be
traced to differences in the underlying customary law. Both the central part of modern Belgium, in which much of the diocese of
Cambrai lay, and Normandy, in which the small monastic jurisdiction
of Montivilliers lay, had their own distinctive customary law during
this period. 9 Or perhaps the differences in the practice of these
two jurisdictions can be explained politically. Cambrai was not subject to the French king in this period;10 Montivilliers was a curiosity,
an exempt jurisdiction under the control of an abbess and hence out
of the mainstream of political and ecclesiastical life. 11 Or perhaps
the differences can be traced to the social structures or customs of
the two areas, or to the types of litigants coming before the two
courts. Mme. Lefebvre-Teillard has not given us the answers to
these questions or even much of the information needed to construct
answers. 12
Although further intensive research into the local practice of the
church courts is obviously necessary, I think the time has come when
we should also begin to compare ecclesiastical practice across national boundaries. Such comparisons would aid in determining the
role each of the multiple forces which influenced ecclesiastical practice played. Studies like Mme. Lefebvre-Teillard's are a necessary
first step, but, unfortunately, when Mme. Lefebvre-Teillard goes
much beyond the French border her mastery deserts her. In drawing
comparisons with England, for example, she makes some use of
however, at least technically obliged to render to each other the "conjugal debt," an
obligation which was occasionally enforced at the instance of one of the parties (pp.
198-99).
9. This is an exceedingly complex topic, particularly for the diocese of Cambrai,
where the variation of customs within the diocese was considerable. See generally
sources cited in INTRODUCTION BIBLIOGRAPIDQUE A L'HISTOIRE DU DROIT ET A L'Em•
NOLOGIE JURIDIQUE (J. Glissen ed.) C/1, nos. 1164-298 (1967) (Normandy); C/3,
nos. 133-52, 158-61, 182 (1971) (Brabant, Hainault, & Cambrai).
10. Although appeal from Cambrai lay to the metropolitan see of Reims, most
appeals seem to have been taken directly to the Court of Rome (p. 201 n.272).
11. See Le Cacheux, Le fonds de l'officialite de Montivilliers, in TRAVAUX DB LA
SBMAINB D'IDSTOIRE DU DROIT NORMAND 275-305 (1928).
12. One of the problems with a survey like Mme. Lefebvre-Teillard's is that important details about individual courts get lost. Despite the excellent series of records
surviving from the officialite of the archdeacon of Paris (p. 5), and despite the fact
that statistics as to the types of cases heard in this court may be found scattered
throughout the book (pp. 111 n.119, 171 n.107, 176 n.131, 198 n.258, 251 n.5 bis),
the reader never really gets a clear picture of the jurisdiction of this important court.
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Woodcock,1 3 but does not seem to know Sheehan,14 or Logan,rn or,
most disturbingly, Marchant,16 whose study of the York courts covers
a period quite close to her own. Those of us who have worked with
the English church courts have been even more parochial: Although
the earliest French church-court records have been in print for some
time, the only English-language study that I know of which uses them
is an unpublished licentiate thesis. 17
What follows is but a series of suggestions for future comparative studies of the English and French church courts. It is based
on my own incomplete knowledge of the English records, and I have
had to rely on memory for some of the examples. Furthermore, my
own work has been principally with English records of the thirteenth
and fourteenth centuries; hence, some of the divergences which I
note between English and French practice may be the result of
differences in time rather than place.
The initial impression that one gets after reading Mme.
Lefebvre-Teillard's account is that the English and French ecclesiastical courts were clearly part of the same world. The procedures
used by both courts were basically the same, even in the respects
in which they differed from the academic law. For example, in
England, as in France (p. 51), it is difficult to distinguish a preemptory exception from a substantive defense; in both English and
French practice the canonical prohibition of women's testimony had
become pretty much a dead letter (p. 82). Many of the basic categories of jurisdiction were also the same: Marriage, testament, contract, benefice, and tithes cases are found in both courts, as well as
a whole series of offenses which were left to the church courts
because of their lack of secular importance or their peculiarly
ecclesiastical nature.
Yet, the closer one looks the more one is struck by the fact that
the differences between the practice of the English and French
ecclesiastical courts are as important, if not more important, than the
similarities. Take, for example, the difficult question of the relationship between the ecclesiastical and the secular courts. In France,
as in England, there was considerable friction between the two, particularly when it came to drawing jurisdictional boundaries. In
France, as in England, the church courts had a considerably broader
13. B. WOODCOCK, supra note 5.
14. M. SHEEHAN, THE WILL IN MEDIBVAL ENGLAND (Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Studies and Texts No. 6, 1963); Sheehan, The Formation and Stability of Marriage in the Fourteenth Century: Evidence of an Ely Register, 33 MEDIEVAL STUDIES 228 (1971).
15. F. LoGAN, EXCOMMUNICATION AND THE SECULAR ARM IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND
(Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Studies and Texts No. 15, 1968).
16. R. MARCHANT, Tim CHlJRCH UNDER nm LAW (1969).
17. K. Corsano, Marriage Law in Fourteenth Century France (1969) (unpublished M.S.L. thesis, on file at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto).
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jurisdiction in fact than they "ought'' to have had, at least if one
determines that "ought" from the judgments of the royal courts. 18
Mme. Lefebvre-Teillard's basic perception of why the church courts
continued to entertain cases that they "ought" not to have heard is,
I think, equally applicable to England: the litigants continued to
come to them. The litigants continued to come for a congery of
reasons that included custom, the fact that churchmen were the traditional arbiters of disputes, and the fact that the church courts were
relatively cheap. The fees seem to have been reasonable; the courts
were, in many instances, situated closer to the litigants; and ecclesiastical court procedure was relatively expeditious (pp. 31, 61-64,
124-26, 265).
On the other hand, there was a marked difference between the
two countries as to where these de facto jurisdictional lines were
drawn. In France, in the early sixteenth century, ordinary contract
litigation continued to constitute a major part of some church courts'
jurisdiction (pp. 222-60), whereas contract cases virtually disappeared from the English church courts during the same period. 19
The French courts also entertained a general action for battery (pp.
125, 128) and actions arising from disputes concerning the segregation of lepers and the appointment of midwives (pp. 123-24); none
of these actions, to my knowledge, were ever entertained by the
English church courts. On the other hand, the jurisdiction of the
French courts in regard to testaments declined in this period
(pp. 116-19), whereas in England it remained an important part of
the ecclesiastical jurisdiction (although shared with the secular
courts). 2° Furthermore, while the French church courts did entertain defamation actions (pp. 114, 125-26), such actions were
obviously not a staple of the courts' jurisdiction, as they were in
England. 21
With regard to the relationship between ecclesiastical and secular
jurisdictions, perhaps the most important difference between the two
countries lay in the dynamics of that relationship. One gets the
impression that the French secular courts were far more vigorous
than the English secular courts in enforcing their jurisdictional pretensions. The basic procedural device in England for enforcing the
claims of secular justice against the church courts was the writ of pro18. See pp. 130-38; Donahue, Roman Canon Law in the Medieval English
Church: Stubbs vs. Maitland Re-examined After 75 Years in the Light of Some Records From the Church Courts, 72 MICH. L. REv. 647, 660-65 (1974).
19. See Helmholz, Assumpsit and Fidei Laesio, 91 L.Q. REv. 406, 427 (1975);
R. Helmholz, Private Actions for Breach of Faith in the Medieval Church Courts
(unpublished paper delivered at Am. Soc. for Legal History, 3d Annual Meeting, Chicago, Nov. 9, 1973). Mme. Lefebvre-Teillard suggests that the French practice may
have ended with the ordonnance of Villers-Cotterets (1539) (pp. 126-27), but the
temporal limitation of her study does not permit her to trace its effects.
20. See R. MARCHANT, supra note 16, at 86-113.
21. See id. at 62.

650

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 74:644

hibition. Although once the royal courts issued such a writ it was
almost always obeyed, its issuance depended in the first instance upon
the willingness of the litigant to go to Westminister to obtain it. 22
In France, too, a litigant could stop an ecclesiastical court from proceeding; this was accomplished by bringing before the secular courts
an appel comme d'abus (pp. 69-70). The French, however, had
an institution for enforcing the royal jurisdiction which, unlike the
English prohibition system, did not depend on the willingness of one
of the litigants to bring his claim to the attention of the secular courts:
the procureurs du roi, who by royal edict were supposed to sit in
every ecclesiastical court and whose principal function in ecclesiastical proceedings seems to have been to ensure that the ecclesiastical
court did not infringe upon the prerogative of the king's courts
(p. 41). Thus, while the situation in England might be described
as one in which a litigant brought before a church court in a matter
that "ought" not to have been there could obtain royal justice if he
wanted it, in France the secular courts attempted to make sure that
the litigant received royal justice whether he wanted it or not.
This difference should not be exaggerated; the number of cases
in the French ecclesiastical courts that "ought" not have been there
should make us cautious of overstatement. Nonetheless, there is
substantial evidence that the French secular jurisdiction was decidedly more at odds with the ecclesiastical jurisdiction than was the
case in England (at least as was the case in England until the
beginning of the seventeenth century). 23 The French church courts
were apparently having difficulty in obtaining the aid of the secular
arm in enforcing their process and judgments (pp. 50, 122) ;24 the
secular theory that all possessory actions belonged in the secular courts
(a marked contrast to the theory in England) 25 was causing the
French church courts to lose benefice and tithe litigation (pp.
119-20, 138); and I know of no instance in England, as there was
in France, of a secular official placing his sergeants on the road to
the church court in order to constrain litigants to buy commissions
forbidding the church court from proceeding (p. 126).26
Much more careful study is needed before we can clarify the
significance of the differences in the way in which the lines of
22. See Donahue, supra note 18, at 665-68, 701, and sources cited therein.
23. On the jurisdictional battle between common lawyers and the church courts
in this period, see generally B. LBVACK, THE CIVIL LAWYERS IN ENGLAND 1603-1641
(1973).
24. In France, an excommunicate had to remain so for a year before the aid of
the secular arm could be invoked; in England, the period was forty days. See generally F. LooAN, supra note 15.
25. In England, the church courts seemed to have used possessory actions to gain
jurisdiction over cases that might otherwise have been heard in the secular courts.
See Donahue, supra note 18, at 661-63. Cf. id. at 676-77.
26. The matter came to litigation, and I doubt it was a common practice.
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ecclesiastical jurisdiction were drawn (both de facto and de jure)
in England and France. As for the difference in dynamics between
the two countries, the French had clearly devised a more effective
enforcement mechanism. Why? Could it be that the English didn't
want a more effective enforcement mechanism? Could it be that
there was a difference in attitude about law enforcement generally?
Another area that presents fertile ground for future comparative
study is the ecclesiastical courts' jurisdiction over marria_ge and
separation. In both England and France, the jurisdiction of the
church courts over marriage matters was probably their most important area of jurisdiction, at least from the point of view of the layman.
Here the significant differences lie not so much in the law applied
(although there are differences), 27 as in the types of cases coming
before the courts. In England, the most frequent type of action
seems to have been one concerning a de presenti marriage performed without regard to the required solemnities28-a "clandestine" marriage, although that term is somewhat misleading. 29 Contrary to what has been suggested elsewhere, 30 Mme. LefebvreTeillard shows quite clearly that such cases did exist in France (pp.
165-71); however, these cases pale in statistical importance before
cases involving contracts to marry (de futuro marriages) and cases
involving marriages formed by a contract to marry followed by intercourse between the parties. 31 Furthermore, and again in contrast
27. Compare pp. 186-200, with R. HELMHOLZ, MARRIAGE LITIGATION IN MEDIEVAL
ENGLAND 100-07 (1974) (separations of goods); pp. 208-12, with R. HELMHOLZ,
supra, at 110 (actions for dowry and marriage portions).
28. See, e.g., R. HELMHOLZ, supra note 27, at 25-26; Sheehan, supra note 13.
29. Many of the "clandestine" marriages that were the subject of litigation in
England were not secret, at least in the sense of unwitnessed; they were merely marriages in which the parties exchanged words of present consent before friends,
rather than before a priest at the church door after the proclamation of the banns.
The Church frowned on informal marriages of this sort, but recognized their validity
until the Council of Trent. See Donahue, The Policy of Alexander Ill's Consent
Theory of Marriage, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF
MEDIEVAL CANON LAW 335 (S. Kuttner ed. 1975).
30. See Levy, L'officialite de Paris et les questions familiales il la fin du XIVe
siecle, in 2 ETUDES D'HISTOIRE DE DROIT CANONIQUE DEDIEES A GABRIEL LB BRAS 1265
(1965); Turlan, Recherches sur le mariage dans la pratique coutumiere (Xlle-XV[e
s.), 35 RP.VUE lllSTORIQUE DU DROIT 477 (4th. ser. 1957).
31. Mme. Lefebvre-Teillard's data seem to include 56 contract cases (p. 148 n.6),
14 clandestine marriages (p. 166 n.82), and approximately 40 contracts followed by
intercourse (p. 171 n.107) for the officialite of the archdeacon of Paris for the years
1499 to 1506. Note 82 is not completely clear as to dates; note 107 refers to 1505
rather than 1506 (probably because the criminal register ends in December 1505,
while the civil register continues until February 1506) and contains an erroneous
cross-reference, which I think is intended to be to note 82. Although further precision on Mme. Lefebvre-Teillard's part would have led to clearer statistics, it is frequently difficult to tell from a register precisely what is at stake. For example, an
entry reproduced on p. 152 n.22 is used to illustrate an order by the official that
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to England, 32 actions for judicial separation made up a significant
portion of the marriage and separation cases before the French
church courts. 33
How are these differences to be explained? Without attempting
to prejudice further research, it strikes me that an explanation for
the first difference-the type of marriage formation case brought
before the courts-may be found in a difference in the underlying
societies. Marriage contracts simply do not seem to have been
much used in England, hence the absence of litigation about them.
The reason why such contracts were not much used may lie in folk
custom, or in the fact that marital property law was relatively inflexible, or in some combination of custom and law. We would need
to know more both about local marriage customs 34 and about who
the litigants were before we could arrive at a definite conclusion on
this matter.
The second difference-the relative absence of separation cases
in the English courts-may be related to a difference in methods
of law enforcement. A figure who played a large role in the French
records (p. 34) and who is notably absent from the English records
is the promoter, a type of prosecutor whose job it was to ferret out
offenders and bring them before the court. 35 French promoters
seem to have regarded it as part of their function to bring before
the court married persons who were not living together (p. 179).
Thus, it may be that the threat of prosecution, coupled with a more
complicated law of marital property, forced couples whose marriage
was breaking up before the French church courts. The courts may,
in turn, have been forced to elaborate on the law of separation of
goods in order to resolve these disputes.
Thus, in the area of marriage litigation, as in the area of the relations between the ecclesiastical and secular jurisdictions, variations
in French and English attitudes toward law enforcement appear to
have had an important influence on the development of differences
in the church courts' practice. The English courts seem to have been
willing to leave much more to the litigants; at least in an instance
case, if the parties did not want to press a point, the court rarely
engaged parties solemnize their marriage, but the entry could also be a sentence in
a case of de presenti informal marriage.
32. See R. HELMHOLZ, supra note 27, at 74-76, 101, 111.
33. There were 29 cases of separation of goods before the Paris archidiaconal officialite between 1500 and 1506 (p. 198 n.258).
34. For example, in marked contrast to France (p. 157) and to what would seem
to be the case for the rest of England, the depositions of the Chester Consistory
Court, 1561-1566, reveal a remarkably large number of cases involving marriage contracts of children below the age of puberty. See CHILD-MARRIAGES, DIVORCES AND
RATIFICATIONS (F. Fumivall ed., Early English Text Society No. 108 (O.S.), 1897).
35. The apparitor (Chaucer's summoner) may have played a somewhat similar
role so far as investigation of offenses is concerned, but I know of no English record
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would. 36 The French courts, on the other hand, without losing sight
of their dispute-resolution function, seem to have been more concerned with law enforcement. For example, the French courts
would fine parties who they discovered had entered into an
informal marriage (pp. 127 n.200, 170-72)-an order that I can't
recall ever having seen in an instance case in England. 37
Is this a national difference (the French were more rigorist than
the English)? Or is it a temporal difference (attitudes toward law
enforcement changed between the fourteenth and the sixteenth
centuries)? Or is it a difference in the type of records we are looking at (more and better criminal registers for higher level courts
survive in France)?
" 'I see,' said he, 'the elephant is very like a wall.' "
Charles Donahue, Jr.
Professor of Law
The University of Michigan
where he presented the case against the accused in court, as did the French promoter.
See, e.g., p. 267 (Doc. 2); p. 268 (Docs. 7, 9).
36. One of the most striking pieces of evidence for the proposition that litigation
was controlled by the parties in England is the large number of cases which were
begun and then dropped before judgment was rendered. See Donahue, supra note
18, at 705-06. The fact that absence of sentences, at least in comparison with the
number of cases begun, was also characteristic of the French records should make
us cautious about overemphasizing the law enforcement role of the French church
courts. Mme. Lefebvre-Teillard attempts to explain this absence of sentences by suggesting that the sentences were imperfectly recorded (pp. 60 n.80, 63 & n.99), but
I find more plausible her suggestion that it was caused as much by settlements as
by incompetence of the clerks (pp. 71-72).
37. Cf. R. HELMHOLZ, supra note 27, at 135-38.

